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A B S T R A C T
We test whether leaders' power shapes their reasoning about moral issues and whether such moral reasoning
subsequently influences leaders' display of self-interested behavior. We use an incentivized experiment to ma-
nipulate two components of leader power: power overmore versus fewer followers and power to enforce one's will
by having discretion over more versus fewer payout options to allocate between oneself and one's followers. We
find that having power over more followers decreased leaders' principled moral reasoning, whereas having
higher power to enforce one's will enabled leaders to engage in self-interested behavior. We also find suggestive
evidence that power over increases self-interested behavior by decreasing principled moral reasoning; the effect
of power to was notmediated by moral reasoning. These results illustrate that power activates self-interest within
and outside the context in which power is held. They also show that moral reasoning is not a stable cognitive
process, but that it might represent an additional path via which power affects self-interested behavior.
Introduction
“I didn't set out to commit a crime. I certainly didn't set out to hurt
anyone. When I was working at Enron, you know, I was kind of a
hero, because I helped the company make its numbers every quarter.
And I thought I was doing a good thing. I thought I was smart. But I
wasn't.”
Andy Fastow – former CFO of Enron (Elkind, 2013)
Power can bring many benefits to those who have it, such as access
to valuable resources or decision autonomy. However, the above ex-
ample is one out of many real life cases suggesting that it may also
corrupt. Unfortunately, prior research testing whether or not power
corrupts suffers from various limitations (e.g., demands characteristics)
that make it difficult to draw conclusions about this effect of power and
about possible processes that may explain it (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015).
In the present paper, we use an incentivized experimental design to
manipulate power and present a novel theoretical approach to whether
and why power might corrupt. In particular, we investigate how power,
defined as “having the discretion and the means to asymmetrically
enforce one's will over others” (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015, p. 139), in-
fluences leaders' engagement in behavior that benefits the self at the
expense of others, hereafter referred to as self-interested behavior. We
also test whether power shapes thinking about moral issues, a process
known as moral reasoning, as a possible mechanism that may explain
why power leads to more self-interested behavior.
Whereas self-interested behavior is not always unethical, it has been
linked to ethical standards in organizations and scholars have called for
more research addressing this type of behavior and in particular the
“thinking behind individuals' self-interested pursuits” (Kish-Gephart,
Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Martin, 2014, p. 267). Given that decisions
made by powerful individuals are often more consequential than those
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made by individuals with less power (Sande, Ellard, & Ross, 1986;
Schaerer, du Plessis, Yap, & Thau, 2018; Van Vugt, 2006), it is im-
portant to understand the processes underlying the decisions made
particularly by powerful individuals. Yet, to date, the relationship be-
tween power and moral reasoning is poorly understood (Bendahan,
Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015) because previous work on power
(measured as hierarchical position in organizations) and moral rea-
soning is correlational (Elm & Nichols, 1993; Ponemon, 1990, 1992;
Weber, 1990, 1996; Weber & Wasieleski, 2001). It is therefore not
possible to conclude from this prior work whether power influences
moral reasoning, whether individuals who use a certain moral rea-
soning are more likely to seek and be promoted to high power positions,
or whether a higher-order, third variable influences both moral rea-
soning and power (Treviño & Weaver, 2003; Treviño, Weaver, &
Reynolds, 2006). We use a manipulation of two dimensions of leader
power (power over others: one vs. three follower and power to enforce
one's will: allocate three vs. four payouts) that capture essential char-
acteristics of power (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) as it exists in organi-
zations (e.g., number of direct reports, Mintzberg, 1979; Sherman et al.,
2012; coercive vs. reward power, French & Raven, 1959). We test if
these two dimensions of leader power influence moral reasoning and
self-interested behavior.
Our research also has implications for our understanding of moral
reasoning. For decades, moral reasoning has been thought to be a stable
process that becomes gradually more principled and less self-centered
with age and that reliably predicts engagement in behaviors that benefit
others and behaviors that benefit the self (see Loe, Mansfield, Ferrell, &
Mansfield, 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008; Treviño et al., 2006, for reviews). In line with untested
suggestions that factors present in the surrounding context can influ-
ence the reasoning that individuals apply to moral dilemmas (cf. Krebs
& Denton, 2005), we study whether power influences moral reasoning.
Furthermore, prior work on the relationship between moral reasoning
and moral behavior is correlational. This makes it impossible to draw
conclusions about the causal ordering of these relationships. By using
our experimental manipulations of power as instrumental variables, our
design allows estimating a causally unambiguous effect of moral rea-
soning on self-interested behavior.
Theoretical framework
Moral reasoning and moral development theory
The most influential theory on moral reasoning and the most in-
fluential theory in moral psychology during the second half of the
twentieth century is Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development.
Kohlberg argued that an individual's judgment of what is morally right
or wrong is influenced by how he or she reasons about moral issues. The
construct of moral development reflects the cognitive structures that
individuals use to reason about what ought to be the morally right thing
to do. An essential feature of Kohlberg's argument is that the ability of
individuals to reason about moral issues develops from childhood on-
ward, following a well-defined hierarchy that spans across six sequen-
tial and irreversible stages (Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg & Kramer,
1969; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Rest, 1975; White, Bushnell, &
Regnemer, 1978).
Stage 1 moral reasoners are guided by the concrete consequences of
their actions, be these punishments or rewards. The just and morally
right action is whichever action satisfies ones' own interests in line with
the principle “what's in it for me?”. Stage 2 moral reasoners rely on
favors and on the principle “you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours”.
Together, Stage 1 and 2 form the pre-conventional moral reasoners group,
whose moral reasoning is motivated by self-interest and are therefore
considered the least sophisticated reasoners.
Stage 3 and Stage 4 form the conventional moral reasoners group
who, unlike the pre-conventional reasoners, are less self-centered and
more other-centered, albeit in a rather instrumental way. Stage 3 moral
reasoners focus on what significant others, such as family members or
peers at work, desire. Judgment of whether an action is morally right is
driven by what is thought to gain social approval and trust from sig-
nificant others. Stage 4 moral reasoners start to incorporate in their
judgment the broader social, legal, or religious systems of norms that
are present within their society.
Stage 5 moral reasoners reason about what action ought to be mo-
rally appropriate by placing emphasis on the collective well-being.
Finally, Stage 6 moral reasoners aim to combine the rules of the society
with universal principles of justice and care for the collective well-
being. Together, Stage 5 and 6 form the post-conventional moral rea-
soners group. Considered to be the most sophisticated and principled
reasoners, individuals in this group approach moral issues in a more
autonomous manner because they move beyond the need to conform
with others' expectations, rules, and laws as well as beyond their own
self-interest of avoiding punishments and gaining rewards when de-
ciding what ought to be the morally appropriate action.
Perhaps owing to its influence in the field, Kohlberg's theory of
moral development has often been the target of criticism. One main
target of criticism has been Kohlberg's argument that moral reasoning
develops one stage at a time, in an upward, progressive manner and
without skipping a stage or regressing to a previously acquired stage
(Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Bush, 1991; Siegler, 1997).
Yet, decades of empirical research provide support for the proposed
sequential stage development (see Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg &
Kramer, 1969; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Rest, 1975; White et al., 1978,
for longitudinal studies) and some have shown that individuals prefer
to reason at the highest acquired stage (Treviño, 1992).
However, some studies found signs of stage regression (cf. Holstein,
1976). Weber (1990) showed that managers used less principled
structures of moral reasoning when responding to dilemmas that in-
volved a business decision compared to dilemmas that involved a non-
business decision (see also Bredemeier & Shields, 1984, 1986 for similar
findings in the sports domain). Similarly, Weber (1996) found that
managers used less principled structures of moral reasoning when re-
sponding to dilemmas that involved psychological, rather than physical
harm. Based on such findings, Krebs and Denton (2005) proposed to
view moral development not as a progression of reasoning stages, but as
an expansion of structures that individuals use when thinking through
moral issues. Defining moral development in terms of structures makes
it clearer that individuals do not abandon their previously acquired
moral reasoning structures. Thus, an individual might be a post-con-
ventional reasoner but, at times, might still reason about moral di-
lemmas the way a conventional reasoner would. Moral development
may therefore not represent a fixed cognitive construct, but it might
instead be relatively flexible and potentially affected by contextual
factors that reside outside the content of the dilemma.
Unfortunately, the available research to date on antecedents of
moral reasoning has rarely looked at the possibility that contextual
factors could affect moral reasoning. In fact, to the best of our knowl-
edge, only Reall, Bailey, and Stoll (1998) investigated contextual fac-
tors outside of the content of the dilemma. In their study, Reall and
colleagues claimed that students used less advanced structures of moral
reasoning during a competitive game than prior to playing the game.
However, the use of different instruments to assess moral reasoning
before and during the game prevents a comprehensive comparison of
moral reasoning between the two time points.
In the following sections, we argue that power is an important but
poorly understood socio-contextual factor that can lower powerholders'
principled moral reasoning.
Power, self-interest, and moral reasoning
As mentioned, we define power as the amount of discretion and
means that one has to influence others in line with one's own will
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(Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). This definition highlights two important
components of power: power to enforce one's will and power over
others. Specifically, power to refers to the amount of discretion, in this
case number of payout options, that leaders have to enforce their will
over others, whereas power over refers to how many others, in this case
followers, are dependent on and affected by the leaders' actions. High
power therefore means having more payout options to choose from and
influence over more followers (see also Bendahan et al., 2015).
Research in the power literature has shown that power enables the
powerholder to engage in self-interested behavior. For instance, van
Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf (2004) found that power increased
individuals' tendency to use information to their personal advantage
and to make more self-serving allocations in an ultimatum game. In a
dictator game context, Handgraaf, van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, and De
Dreu (2008) found that higher power made powerholders more self-
interested, although this effect diminished when the powerholder in-
teracted with an entirely powerless other. Bendahan et al. (2015)
showed that leaders who had more power, that is, more followers and
more discretionary choices, were more likely to make decisions that
increased their own payouts by eroding the payouts to their followers.
Rucker, Dubois, and Galinsky (2011) found that power increased
spending on the self. Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) found that
power increased unethical behavior (e.g., lying) when it benefited the
self, but decreased unethical behavior when it benefited others. Finally,
Lammers and Stapel (2009) found that power increased reliance on
rule-based moral frameworks when a decision would not affect the
powerholder, whereas power increased reliance on an outcome-based
moral framework when a decision would benefit the powerholder.
The effects of power on self-interested behavior can be understood
through the lenses of research showing that power activates cognitive
networks (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Smith & Galinsky,
2010; Tost, 2015) and, in particular, cognitive networks related to goal
focus (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007a, 2007b,
2008, 2017). A cognitive network represents an unconscious learnt
association that, once activated, persists over various contexts (Luchins,
1942) and can even influence choices on unrelated tasks (Smith &
Galinsky, 2010). The idea is that over time, individuals' direct or in-
direct experiences with power produce a set of learnt cognitive, affec-
tive, and even behavioral associations around the concept of power and
these associations are stored in memory (Smith & Galinsky, 2010; Tost,
2015). Importantly, self-interest, that is a focus on what benefits the
self, represents a pervasive goal that exerts a strong and unconscious
influence on judgment and behavior (Moore & Loewenstein, 2004;
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006) and various streams of re-
search provide evidence for such a claim. For instance, research on ego
depletion shows that people are more likely to engage in behaviors,
such as lying or cheating, that bring short-term benefits, such as higher
compensation, for the self rather than for others when their cognitive
resources are depleted (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011;
Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; see also Shalvi, Eldar, &
Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Neuropsychological research provides further
evidence that people's automatic tendency is to serve their self-interest.
Trying to override self-interested tendencies activates brain areas as-
sociated with self-control (Greene & Paxton, 2010). In sum, power ac-
tivates a cognitive network that is associated with one's goal of self-
interest.
Prior work on power indicates that goal-focused cognitive networks
drive powerholders' responses not only within the context in which
power is held (Guinote, 2007a, 2008), but also outside such a context
(Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b; Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013). For
instance, Galinsky et al. (2003) found that individuals in a high power
position were more likely to take a card in a blackjack game that was
presented as unrelated to their power role compared to individuals in a
low power position. The authors explained this effect in terms of the
cognitive association between the concept of power and the behavioral
tendency of taking action. Similarly, Guinote (2007b) found that power
facilitated goal-consistent responses that resided outside the context in
which power was exercised. As a final example, Wiltermuth and Flynn
(2013) showed that individuals who were asked to recall an instance in
which they had high power felt more certain in judging the current
ethical transgressions of others, compared to individuals who were
asked to recall an instance in which they had low power.
In sum, power triggers goal-focused cognitive networks that can
affect powerholders' responses inside and outside of the situation in
which power is exercised, and power also enhances a focus on self-
interest. We therefore argue that power and its effects on self-interest
will emerge not only in the power context by enhancing self-interested
behavior, but also beyond the power context. In his theory of moral
development, Kohlberg argues that the more advanced, principled
structures of moral reasoning reflect a reasoning based on considera-
tions of justice and care for the collective well-being. Thus, the more
advanced moral reasoning structures reflect a less self-interested
thinking compared to the less advanced moral reasoning structures. In
line with Kohlberg's argument, we therefore argue that having high
power will reduce the use of principled structures of moral reasoning.
It is further possible that having power influences self-interested
behavior, via moral reasoning. Empirical work has generally found
weak correlations between moral reasoning and self-interested beha-
viors (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Villegas de Posada &
Vargas-Trujillo, 2015).5 Among others, past research found moral rea-
soning to be moderately correlated with reduced cheating (Malinowski
& Smith, 1985), fewer unethical decisions (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984),
higher altruism (Underwood & Moore, 1982), and higher honesty (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010; Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015). As
noted, there is also ample empirical evidence showing that power in-
creases individuals' propensity to enact self-interested behaviors
(Bendahan et al., 2015; Dubois et al., 2015; Handgraaf et al., 2008;
Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Rucker et al., 2011; van Dijk et al., 2004; for
overviews see Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015; Sturm & Antonakis,
2015; Tost, 2015). Together, these streams of research suggest that
power may have an indirect effect on self-interested behavior, via moral
reasoning.
Study overview
Most of the experimental papers on power mentioned above (Dubois
et al., 2015; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a, 2007b, 2008;
Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Rucker et al., 2011; Wiltermuth & Flynn,
2013; for exceptions see Bendahan et al., 2015; Handgraaf et al., 2008;
van Dijk et al., 2004) use the recall procedure (i.e., asking participants
to recall a time when they had power over others vs. when others had
power over them) or the role assignment procedure (i.e., placing par-
ticipants in a manager vs. a subordinate role) to manipulate power.
However, both manipulations of power might induce demand effects
because they provide cues about the purpose of the study, leading
participants to behave in line with implicit expectations of how they
think they are expected to behave (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). It is
therefore unclear whether the effects of power observed in studies using
the recall or the role assignment procedure are due to having power or
due to participants doing what is asked or implicitly expected of them
to do.
To avoid demand effects, we follow recommendations from Sturm
and Antonakis (2015) and use a power manipulation procedure
5 Individual studies, however, show variation in whether moral reasoning
predicts behavior with some studies finding no relationship (e.g., Cohen,
Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014; West, Ravenscroft, & Shrader, 2004) and
some even finding a negative relationship (e.g., Au & Wong, 2000). The reason
could well be the different conceptualizations and measures of behavior: Cohen
and colleagues looked at organizational citizenship behaviors and counter-
productive work behaviors, whereas Au and Wong looked at ethical judgment.
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developed by Bendahan et al. (2015) that orthogonally manipulates two
dimensions of leader power: power over others (one vs. three followers)
and power to enforce one's will (having discretion over three vs. four
options of payouts to allocate between the leader and their followers).
Method
Participants and design
Four hundred and forty five undergraduate business students from a
medium-sized European university participated in return for course
credits and money (N=220) or just for money (N=225).6 We ran-
domly assigned 177 out of these participants to one of four leader
conditions in a two-by-two design (power over: 1 vs. 3 followers; power
to: 3 vs. 4 payout options). We assigned the remaining students to the
follower role.7 Participants were paid according to the payment struc-
ture that Bendahan et al. (2015) employed, although payments were
made in Euro instead of Swiss Francs (see Table 1 for the payment
structure). In the leader condition with 4 payout options (3 payout
options), leaders could earn between €11 and €18.5 (€10.5 and €13.5),
whereas subordinates could earn between €0.5 and €10.5 (€6.5 and
€10.5). Because our focus is on leader power, we did not analyze the
follower data (for a similar procedure, see Bendahan et al., 2015).
Based on criteria explained below (see “Participant exclusion”), we
excluded 28 participants, leaving 149 participants to be included in
subsequent data analyses. Of the 149 participants, 51.7% were male
and the average age was 20.68 years (SD=2.42). Thirty-nine percent
indicated currently having a job, working on average 13.27 h per week
(SD=9.68). In terms of education, 82.6% had a high school diploma,
14.8% had a bachelor's diploma, 0.7% had a master's diploma, and 2%
indicated having finished another type of education (e.g., whether or
not they passed the first year exam for the bachelor's studies).
Participant exclusion
Out of the 177 participants that were assigned to the leader role, 12
were excluded because they were in a session of only two students,
which reduces participants' anonymity. We excluded two additional
participants because they were in a session with four students and were
assigned to the leader condition in which they had power over three
followers, which again reduces participants' anonymity.8
In line with recommendations from Rest (1986), we checked the
reliability and consistency of participants' answers on the Defining Is-
sues Test (DIT), an established moral reasoning test (Kish-Gephart et al.,
2010; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006). Eleven
participants failed the reliability check, meaning that they gave a rating
higher than four for certain items that were written to sound ex-
aggeratedly fancy but were actually nonsensical, such as in the Doctor's
dilemma item number six: “What is the value of death prior to society's
perspective on personal values?”. Five participants failed the consistency
check, meaning that they chose a ranking order that was not in line
with the chosen importance ratings across two or all three dilemmas. In
line with recommendations from Rest (1986), we excluded these par-
ticipants from further analyses.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory in two consecutive
academic years.9 All information was presented on paper. In each ses-
sion, we informed students that their compensation for participating in
the study would depend either on their own decision or on the decision
of another student in the room who would be assigned the role of the
leader. To further ensure that role assignment was anonymous, we in-
structed participants not to talk with each other. Depending on the
number of students present in each session, we randomly arranged the
booklets with the leader and, respectively, follower condition on the
tables and asked students to pick a place to sit. There were five long
tables in the group lab with two chairs placed at each end, thereby
ensuring that students would not be able to see each other's papers and
determine who was in which role. Once seated, students were in-
structed to open the booklet in front of them and read about their role
and the payout options; the number of followers over whom they had
power depended on whether they were in the leader condition with
more (three followers) or less (one follower) power over others; simi-
6 We ran the analyses only with participants who took part in our study for
credits (N=109), meaning that the payment was extra, and found similar re-
sults to those presented in the main text except that in Model 4 the effect of
moral reasoning on self-interested behavior (β=−0.02, z=−0.82, p= .414)
and the mediation effect (indirect effect=0.06, bootstrap S.E. = 0.05, 95% bias-
corrected CI: [−0.0099; 0.1835]) were no longer significant, potentially due to
reduced statistical power. The sample size reported here (N=109) is different
from the one reported in the main text (N=220) for two reasons. First, out of
these 220 respondents who participated just for money, only 123 were assigned
the role of the leader. The remaining participants were assigned to be followers
and were therefore not part of the main analyses. Second, out of those assigned
to be a leader, we excluded participants who failed the reliability and validity
check for the moral reasoning scale (N=11) and those who were in sessions
where we could not guarantee anonymity (N=3, see footnote 7 for additional
explanations).
7 Given the challenge of running group studies in the laboratory and the time
constrains we faced, we decided to maximize the data sample by allowing the
sessions to vary in size. To preserve anonymity, we aimed for sessions of at least
four students. However, there were cases when students cancelled last minute
or were more than 15min late for the group study. In such cases, we either
discarded the data (if the session consisted of only two or four students, de-
pending on the required leader condition; see “Participant exclusion”) or we
assigned the follower role to two students for the leader condition with one
follower (if the session consisted of only three students). If the session consisted
of four students, we assigned two leader conditions with one follower. If the
session consisted of six students, we either assigned three leader conditions with
one follower or one leader condition with three followers and one leader con-
dition with one follower. We followed a similar assignment of leader conditions
for sessions with more than six students. We recorded the session size only
during the second period of the data collection (n=51). For sessions with 3
students, we had 5 leaders with 1 follower/3 payout options and 2 leaders with
1 follower/4 payout options. For sessions with 4 students, we had 6 leaders
with 1 follower/3 payout options, 2 leaders with 3 followers/3 payout options,
3 leaders with 1 follower/4 payout options, and 2 leaders with 3 followers/4
payout options. For sessions with 5 students, we had 2 leaders with 1 follower/
4 payout options. For sessions with 6 students, we had 1 leader with 1 follower/
3 payout options, 2 leaders with 3 followers/3 payout options, 1 leader with 1
follower/4 payout options, and 1 leader with 3 followers/4 payout options. For
sessions with 8 students, we had 6 leaders with 1 follower/3 payout options, 4
leaders with 3 followers/3 payout options, 6 leaders with 1 follower/4 payout
options, and 3 leaders with 3 followers/4 payout options. For sessions with 16
students, we had 2 leaders with 3 followers/3 payout options, 2 leaders with 1
follower/4 payout options, and 1 leaders with 3 followers/4 payout options.
8 Results with the inclusion of these 14 participants (N=161) are similar to
those presented in the main text except, in Model 2 number of followers sig-
nificantly predicts moral reasoning (β=−7.67, z=−2.75, p= .006),
whereas the effect of number of options on moral reasoning (β=−1.10,
z=−0.39, p= .697) and the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested be-
havior (β=−0.21, z=−1.17, p= .242) are no longer significant. In Model 4,
the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested behavior is also no longer sig-
nificant (β=−0.14, z=−1.16, p= .246). Moreover, across models 1, 3 and
4, the effect of number of options on self-interested behavior is no longer sig-
nificant, suggesting that perhaps when leaders could identify who their fol-
lowers are, they might be less likely to engage in self-interested behavior.
However, the indirect effect of number of followers on self-interested behavior,
via moral reasoning, was still significant (indirect effect=1.08, bootstrap
SE=1.19, 95% bias-corrected CI: [0.0288; 5.1007]).
9 We collected 65.8% of the data in January–February 2017 and 34.2% of the
data in May–June 2018. The data collection period did not correlate sig-
nificantly with any of our study variables (see Table 2).
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larly, the payout options depended on whether they were in the leader
condition with more (four payout options) or less (three payout op-
tions) power to enforce their will. The instructions further read that
leaders would need to make one single decision and that this decision
would impact not only their own payment, but also that of the other
students present in the room who were assigned to be his/her follower
(s). At this point, participants were only informed about their payout
options and were told that they would need to decide on the payout for
themselves and their followers at the end of the study, allowing for
causal inferences between moral reasoning and the payout decision.
Following the information about their role, we measured partici-
pants' moral reasoning structure. Afterwards, participants were re-
minded of the payout options and were asked to circle the payout op-
tion they decided upon. They were again reminded that their decision
would impact the payment of their assigned follower(s) who, as in-
dicated before, were present with them in the room. Demographics such
as age, gender, education, and work experience were recorded at the
beginning of the study, on the first page of the booklet.
Moral reasoning
We measured participants' moral reasoning with the short form of
Rest's (1986) DIT. The short DIT form is comprised of a subset of three
out of six moral dilemmas. Participants were presented with the fol-
lowing three dilemmas: (1) the Student take-over: whether or not stu-
dents should take over an administration building to protest war; (2)
the Webster story: whether or not a minority member should be hired
when the community is clearly biased against minorities; and (3) the
Doctor's dilemma: whether or not a doctor should administer an over-
dose of painkillers to a patient in pain.
For each dilemma, we asked participants to complete three tasks.
First, we asked participants to indicate a decision or action choice on a
3-point scale: 1 (take action), 2 (can't decide), and 3 (not take action).
Next, we asked participants to rate the relative importance of 12 items
(e.g., item from the Webster story: “Whether hiring capable men like Mr.
Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society?”) in helping
them make the decision on a 5-point scale from 1 (no importance) to 5
(great importance). Lastly, we presented participants with all 12 items
again and we asked them to rank the four most important ones in
helping them make the decision. The 12 items for each dilemma are
designed to be consistent with reasoning at various stages of moral
development, or else are designed for reliability purposes. In line with
previous literature (Abdolmohammadi & Sultan, 2002; Cummings,
Dyas, Maddux, & Kochman, 2001; Jordan, Brown, Treviño, &
Finkelstein, 2011), we derived the P-score as an overall measure of
moral reasoning. The P-score represents the percentage of items com-
prising the principled reasoning stages from Kohlberg (Stage 5 and 6;
1981, 1984). In other words, the P-score indicates the degree to which
individuals place great importance on post-conventional and principled
considerations when making a decision. A higher P-score represents a
less self-centered and a more principled structure of moral reasoning.10
Self-interested behavior
We operationalized self-interested behavior as the decision that
leaders made in terms of payouts for themselves and for their followers.
In line with the procedures outlined by Bendahan et al. (2015), we
presented Option 1 as the “default option” and all the other payout
options as “Option 2,” “Option 3,” and “Option 4”, respectively. As can
be seen in Table 1, the leader would be paid slightly more than the
follower in the default option, whereas the payouts for the leader and
the follower would be the same at a cost incurred by the leader for
“Option 2” (prosocial option). “Option 3” and “Option 4” represent
progressively higher payouts for the leader, but also an erosion of the
public surplus by decreasing the payouts to the follower(s). Thus,
choosing “Option 3” or “Option 4” is an operationalization of self-in-
terested behavior because it represents making a socially inefficient
choice that heightens one's own personal profit (see also Dubois et al.,
2015). To avoid adding potential confounds, we kept a constant ratio of
leader gains to follower losses of 5 to 6 across conditions.
Results and discussion
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations
among our variables. Table 3 presents the frequency of choices parti-
cipants made across the leader power conditions.
Hypothesis testing
We tested our hypothesis using structural equations modeling with
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in STATA (Version 15.1). We
present graphic representations of the statistical models used (see
Fig. 1) and the corresponding statistical equations (see Appendix A). We
Table 1
Payment structure used.
Leader's decision choice To leader To 1 follower To leader To each of 3 followers
1 follower, 3 payout options 3 followers, 3 payout options
Default 220 190 220 190
Pro-social Minus 10 points Plus 20 points Minus 10 points Plus 20 points
Antisocial Plus 50 points Minus 60 points Plus 50 points Minus 20 points
1 follower, 4 payout options 3 follower, 4 payout options
Default 220 190 220 190
Pro-social Minus 10 points Plus 20 points Minus 10 points Plus 20 points
Antisocial Plus 50 points Minus 60 points Plus 50 points Minus 20 points
Very antisocial Plus 150 points Minus 180 points Plus 150 points Minus 60 points
Note. Students were informed that 100 points was the equivalent of 5 Euro.
10 We also computed the N2-score, which is based on the ratings and the
rankings of the 12 items and represents the relative preference participants give
to items representing the principled structures of moral reasoning (Stage 5 and
6), in comparison to items representing the more self-centered, conventional
(Stage 3 and 4) and pre-conventional structures of moral reasoning (Stage 1 and
2) (see Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997). Results with the N2-score were
similar to those obtained with the P-score except in Model 2 the effect of the
N2-score on self-interested behavior was no longer significant (β=−0.12,
z=−1.95, p= .051). However, this model barely passed the over-
identification tests (LR test of model vs. saturated model: χ2[3]= 7.13,
p= .068; Satorra-Bentler scaled test: χ2[3]=7.52, p= .057). Importantly, the
indirect effect of number of followers on self-interested behavior, via the N2-
score, was still significant (indirect effect=0.06, bootstrap SE=0.04, 95% bias-
corrected CI: [0.0048; 0.1946]). Overall, these results illustrate that number of
followers affects in a similar manner the proportion of the principled to the
more self-centered structures of moral reasoning and subsequently self-inter-
ested behavior.
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Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among our variables.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. P-score (moral reasoning) 39.32 13.47 –
2. Number of followersa 0.42 0.49 −0.22 –
3. Number of payout optionsb 0.48 0.50 −0.06 −0.03 –
4. Self-interested behaviorc 2.24 0.94 −0.18 0.02 0.33 –
5. Age 20.68 2.42 0.01 −0.16 −0.04 −0.06 –
6. Genderd 0.48 0.50 0.08 0.02 0.01 −0.14 −0.09 –
7. Educatione 1.22 0.55 −0.13 −0.12 0.19 0.11 0.56 −0.02 –
8. Workf 0.42 0.53 0.08 0.08 −0.06 −0.10 0.04 0.00 0.05 –
9. Work hours 13.27 9.68 −0.17 0.04 −0.07 −0.08 0.55 −0.17 0.44 −0.16 –
10. Compensationg 0.26 0.44 0.02 −0.37 0.25 0.15 0.26 0.05 0.30 −0.21 0.24 –
11. Session sizeh 6.76 3.64 0.01 0.26 0.13 0.15 −0.15 −0.01 −0.15 −0.12 −0.17 0.20 –
12. Data collection periodi 0.66 0.47 −0.06 0.14 0.05 0.09 −0.06 −0.23 −0.06 −0.10 0.03 −0.16 – –
Note. N=149. For significance levels, r > |0.17|, p < .05; r > |0.22|, p < .01; r > |0.27|, p < .001.
a Coded as 0=One follower, 1=Three followers.
b Coded as 0=Three payout options, 1= Four payout options.
c Coded as 1=Default decision, 2=Pro-social decision, 3=Antisocial decision; 4=Very antisocial decision.
d Coded as 0=Male, 1= Female.
e Coded as 1=High-school degree, 2= Bachelor degree, 3=Master degree, 4=Other.
f Coded as 1=Working, 0=Not working.
g Coded as 1=Money, 0=Course credits and money.
h Recorded only during the second data collection period (n=51).
i Coded as 0=data collected in 2018, 1= data collected in 2017.
Table 3
Frequency distribution (count) of payout options chosen by leader condition.
Leader decision
choice (payout
option chosen)
Leader condition
1 follower, 3
payout options
3 follower, 3
payout options
1 follower, 4
payout options
3 follower, 4
payout options
Total
Default 16 (44.4%) 8 (22.2%) 7 (19.4%) 5 (13.9%) 36
Prosocial 16 (28.1%) 17 (29.8%) 13 (22.8%) 11 (19.3%) 57
Antisocial 10 (25%) 9 (22.5%) 14 (35%) 7 (17.5%) 40
Very antisocial – – 9 (56.3%) 7 (43.8%) 16
Total 42 (28.2%) 34 (22.8%) 43 (28.9%) 30 (20.1%) 149
Note. N=149.
Percentage within leader decision choice is presented within brackets.
1C. Model 3  
Number  
of 
followers 
Number 
of payout  
options 
Moral 
reasoning 
Self-
interested 
behavior 
1D. Model 4  
Number  
of 
followers 
Number 
of payout  
options 
Moral 
reasoning 
Self-
interested 
behavior 
1B. Model 2  1A. Model 1 
Number 
of 
followers 
Number 
of payout  
options 
Moral 
reasoning 
Self-
interested 
behavior 
Number 
of 
followers 
Number 
of payout 
options 
Moral 
reasoning 
Self-
interested 
behavior 
Fig. 1. Graphical representations of the statistical models.
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included compensation (whether participation was for credits or
money) and its interaction terms with both power conditions as control
variables across all models11 for two reasons. First, compensation cor-
related significantly with the two power conditions and marginally with
self-interested behavior. Second, having participants who took our
study for money and/or credits represents the primary difference be-
tween our design and that of Bendahan et al. (2015) who gave all their
participants a show-up fee.
We first estimated a model in which the observed exogenous vari-
ables power over (number of followers: 1 vs. 3) and power to (number of
payout options: 3 vs. 4) predicted the observed endogenous variables,
moral reasoning and self-interested behavior (see Fig. 1A; Table 4,
Model 1). Power over more (vs. fewer) followers led to less principled
moral reasoning, but did not affect self-interested behavior. Having
power to choose among more (vs. fewer) payout options led to more
self-interested behavior, but did not affect moral reasoning.12
Next, we examined whether power indirectly influenced leaders'
tendency to engage in self-interested behavior, via moral reasoning. To
do so, we fitted a structural equations model (using ML estimation), as
above, but this time, the observed endogenous variable self-interested
behavior was predicted by the endogenous variable moral reasoning
only. Moral reasoning was predicted by the exogenous variables:
number of followers and number of payout options (see Fig. 1B; see
Table 4, Model 2). In this model, we found a significant effect of moral
reasoning on self-interested behavior. The effect of number of followers
on moral reasoning was not significant, whereas the effect of number of
payout options on moral reasoning was. However, this model barely
passed the overidentification test (LR test of model vs. saturated model:
χ2[3]= 7.39, p= .060; Satorra-Bentler scaled test: χ2[3]= 7.45,
p= .059), suggesting that model restrictions are not tenable and that
this model does not provide a valid representation of the data.
We performed post-hoc exploratory analyses in which self-inter-
ested behavior was predicted by the endogenous observed variable,
moral reasoning, and the exogeneous variable, number of payout op-
tions. Moral reasoning was predicted by the exogenous variables,
number of followers and number of payout options (see Fig. 1C; see
Table 4, Model 3). In this model, we found no effect of moral reasoning
on self-interested behavior. As in the first analysis however, we find
that number of payout options significantly influenced self-interested
behavior. This analysis further revealed a significant effect of number of
followers on moral reasoning. The overidentification tests were not
significant (LR test of model vs. saturated model: χ2[1]= 0.06,
p= .801; Satorra-Bentler scaled test: χ2[1]= 0.04, p= .834), sug-
gesting that model restrictions were tenable.
Next, we tested whether there is endogeneity in the effect of moral
reasoning on self-interested behavior using two-stage least squares
(2SLS) regression (see Table 5). In the first stage, moral reasoning was
instrumented using number of payout options, number of followers, and
the three control variables (compensation and its interaction terms with
the power conditions). In the second stage, the instrumented moral
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11 We conducted additional analyses that included all control variables for
which we had complete data across both data collection periods namely:
compensation and its interaction terms with the two power conditions, age,
gender, work, education, and data collection period. Results were similar to
those presented in the main text except that, probably as a result of reduced
statistical power, in Model 4, the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested
behavior was no longer significant (β=−0.008, z=−1.59, p= .112) and the
mediation effect was also no longer significant: indirect effect=0.05, bootstrap
S.E. = 0.04, 95% bias-corrected CI: [−0.0049; 0.1701].
12 A two-factor ANOVA in SPSS revealed no significant interaction between
the two dimensions of leader power on moral reasoning (β=−0.39,
SE=4.38, F[1, 145]=0.008, p= .929) or on self-interested behavior
(β=−0.22, SE=0.29, F[1, 145]= 0.552, p= .459). We therefore estimated
only main effects of these two independent power variables in the structural
equations models.
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reasoning was entered as a substitute for its endogenous term used in
the traditional OLS model plus the exogenous variable number of
payout options and the three control variables. Given that number of
followers does not correlate with self-interested behavior (see Table 2
and Table 4, Model 1), we did not include this variable as a predictor of
self-interested behavior. The overidentification test was not significant
(Sargan-Hansen χ2[1]= 0.18, p= .669), suggesting that model re-
strictions were tenable. However, the weak instruments robust tests
were not significant (Anderson-Rubin Wald test, χ2[1]= 0.72,
p= .397; Stock-Wright LM S statistic, χ2[1]= 0.71, p= .398), sug-
gesting that the null hypothesis that the instruments selected are weak
cannot be rejected. The Wu-Hausman F test (F[1, 142]= 0.17,
p= .677) and the Durbin-Wu-Husman test (χ2[1]= 0.18, p= .669),
which assess the improvement in model fit when treating moral rea-
soning as exogenous rather than endogenous to self-interested beha-
vior, were not significant, suggesting that there is no endogeneity in
moral reasoning and that the 2SLS estimates are similar to the OLS
estimates.
In light of the tentative 2SLS findings, which provide no evidence
for endogeneity in the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested be-
havior, we fitted a structural equations model (using ML estimation) in
which the observed endogenous variable, self-interested behavior, was
predicted by moral reasoning and number of payout options, and both
of these predictors were treated as exogenous to self-interested beha-
vior (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Kennedy, 2008).
In model terms, we did not allow covariance between the error terms of
moral reasoning and self-interested behavior. Moral reasoning was
predicted by the exogenous variables, number of followers and number
of payout options (see Fig. 1D; see Table 4, Model 4). In this model, we
found significant effects of moral reasoning and of number of payout
options on self-interested behavior. Moral reasoning was significantly
influenced by number of followers. The over-identification tests were
not significant (LR test of model vs. saturated model: χ2[2]= 0.22,
p= .893; Satorra-Bentler scaled test: χ2[2]= 0.18, p= .910), sug-
gesting that these post-hoc specifications in the model were not rejected
by the data.
We subsequently conducted indirect effects tests using the bootstrap
subcommand of SEM in STATA to obtain bias-corrected confidence
intervals. Results revealed a significant indirect effect of number of
followers on self-interested behavior, via moral reasoning (indirect ef-
fect=0.07, bootstrap SE=0.04, 95% bias-corrected CI: [0.0079;
0.2056]).
Table 5
Two-least square (2SLS) regression with compensation and its interaction terms
with both power conditions as control variables.
Predictors First stage
regression on
moral reasoning
Second stage
regression on self-
interested behavior
Estimate Estimate
Moral reasoning −0.02 (0.02)
Number of followersa −6.62 (2.58)⁎
Number of payout optionsb −2.92 (2.61) 0.55 (0.20)⁎⁎
Compensationc −6.91 (4.91) 0.21 (0.33)
Compensation ∗Number of
followers
4.73 (7.40) −0.11 (0.46)
Compensation ∗Number of
payout options
7.28 (5.65) −0.03 (0.43)
Note. N=149.
a Coded as 0=One follower, 1=Three followers.
b Coded as 0=Three payout options, 1= Four payout options.
c Coded as 1=Money, 0=Course credits and money. Standard errors are
presented in brackets.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎ p < .05.
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Supplemental analyses
We conducted additional analyses without control variables (see
Tables 6 and 7). Results were similar to those presented above except
Model 2 in which the effect of number of payout options on moral
reasoning and the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested behavior
were no longer significant. However, the overidentification tests were
significant (LR test of model vs. saturated model: χ2[1]= 7.40,
p= .007; Satorra-Bentler scaled test: χ2[1]= 8.05, p= .005), sug-
gesting that model restrictions are not tenable and that the model does
not provide a valid representation of the data. Importantly, the indirect
effect of number of followers on self-interested behavior, via moral
reasoning, was still significant (indirect effect=0.06, bootstrap
SE=0.04, 95% bias-corrected CI: [0.0087; 0.1751]).
Discussion
We hypothesized that having high, as opposed to low, power not
only increases self-interested behavior, but also decreases the use of
principled moral reasoning. Results from an experiment in which we
manipulated leader power along two dimensions (power over: one vs.
three followers; power to: having discretion over three vs. four payout
options to allocate between the leader and their followers) provide
partial support for our prediction. Specifically, we found that partici-
pants who had power over more (vs. fewer) followers, were less likely
to use moral reasoning structures that emphasize considerations of
justice and care for the collective well-being. However, participants
who were given more (vs. fewer) payout options to enforce their will
over their followers did not differ in how they reasoned about moral
issues, but they did have a higher tendency to engage in self-interested
behavior. We further found suggestive evidence that having power over
more followers indirectly increased self-interested behavior, via the use
of less principled moral reasoning structures.
Theoretical and practical implications
Our findings have implications for the power literature. Prior re-
search has shown that power prompts the powerholder to engage in
self-interested behaviors (Bendahan et al., 2015; Dubois et al., 2015;
Handgraaf et al., 2008; Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Rucker et al., 2011;
van Dijk et al., 2004). Moreover, prior theoretical work (Smith &
Galinsky, 2010; Tost, 2015) argues that the effects of power can in-
fluence powerholders' responses outside the context in which power is
acquired. Building and expanding such work, we showed that leaders'
power to enforce their will over others does make the leader more fo-
cused on their self-interest within the situation in which their power is
grounded, whereas leaders' power over others extends beyond such
contexts to, for example, how leaders judge what action would be
morally preferred in a context that was unrelated to their power. The
novelty of our paper lies in that we focus on power and its effects on
self-interest that was either connected to the power context (i.e., self-
interested behavior) or that transcended the power context (i.e., less use
of the principled moral reasoning).
Our results further suggest a more nuanced understanding of why
power leads to self-interested behavior. Research shows that power
makes people more effective in pursuing their goals (Guinote, 2007c).
Because self-interest is such a goal (Moore et al., 2006; Moore &
Loewenstein, 2004), it should be enhanced by having high power. We
found suggestive evidence that power (operationalized as number of
followers) also makes people more likely to engage in self-interested
behaviors via the mediating mechanism of reasoning about moral di-
lemmas in more self-interested ways, that is by triggering less prin-
cipled structures of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning scholars have
explained the effect of moral reasoning on moral behavior in terms of
consistency between thoughts and actions (Blasi, 1980; Kish-Gephart
et al., 2010; Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015). As a result,
how individuals think about moral issues should be reflected in how
they behave. Our findings thus suggest a specific process through which
power may influence self-interested behavior: power makes people
approach moral issues in less principled ways, which increases the
motivation to behave more in line with one's self-interest.
Moreover, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to attempt
to derive an estimate of the effect of moral reasoning on self-interested
behavior, using 2SLS regressions with the exogenous dimensions of
power as instrumental variables. Prior research on the relationship
between moral reasoning and outcome variables has been correlational.
This means that any correlation obtained in prior work could imply an
effect of moral reasoning on the outcome variable, an effect of the
outcome variable on moral reasoning, the operation of a higher level
variable that causes both moral reasoning and the outcome, or even
method artifacts (e.g., common method variance). Our analytic ap-
proach can, in principle, address such issues (Antonakis et al., 2010;
Kennedy, 2008). Our results suggest that moral reasoning influences
self-interested behavior (rather than just being correlated with it), al-
though this conclusion should be taken with caution given that our
instrumental variables were not strong.
Finally, by showing that power over others leads to lower principled
moral reasoning, our research also has implications for our under-
standing of moral reasoning processes. Previous research addressing the
link between power and moral reasoning used correlational designs
(Elm & Nichols, 1993; Ponemon, 1990, 1992; Weber, 1990, 1996;
Weber & Wasieleski, 2001), making it impossible to draw any conclu-
sions about causality. For decades, scholars studied moral reasoning as
a cognitive process that progresses to more complex, principled struc-
tures of reasoning over relatively long periods of time (Kohlberg, 1969;
Loe et al., 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008; Treviño et al., 2006). Our results indicate that moral
reasoning is less stable than it is often portrayed to be and that factors
unrelated to the moral issue, such as having power in a context outside
the dilemma, influence moral reasoning.
From a practical perspective, understanding the impact of power on
moral reasoning and self-interested behavior is important for various
reasons. First, decisions about moral issues are often made in asym-
metric and unequal-power relationships (Lammers, Galinsky, Dubois, &
Rucker, 2015) that heightened the salience of self-interest (Schaerer
et al., 2018). Second, high power organizational leaders are considered
Table 7
Two-least square (2SLS) regression without control variables.
Predictors First stage regression
on moral reasoning
Second stage regression on
self-interested behavior
Estimate Estimate
Moral reasoning −0.01 (0.02)
Number of followersa −6.10 (2.18)⁎⁎
Number of payout
optionsb
−1.86 (2.16) 0.60 (0.14)⁎⁎⁎
Note. N=149.
Standard errors are presented in brackets.
a Coded as 0=One follower, 1=Three followers.
b Coded as 0=Three payout options, 1= Four payout options.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
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to be the central points of information in organizations and, for that
reason, they are often charged with formulating and communicating
not only strategic plans, but also the organization's value system
(Ireland & Hitt, 1999; Treviño & Brown, 2004; Weaver, Treviño, & Agle,
2005). As a result, the decisions made by those in high power positions
are arguably more consequential than the decisions made by those in
lower power positions (Sande et al., 1986; Schaerer et al., 2018; Van
Vugt, 2006) because they affect those working in the organization as
well as other stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and ultimately
the society the organization operates in (Brown & Treviño, 2006;
Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Jordan et al., 2011; Treviño, 1986;
Treviño et al., 2006). In line with the confession of Andy Fastow, our
results illustrate that the more power one has, the less likely it is to
include principles of justice and care for the collective well-being in
one's moral reasoning. As a result, the powerholder may be more likely
to view their actions as justifiable in line with their duty to the well-
being of the company (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
Strengths, limitations, and suggestions for future research
The experimental design of our study has notable strengths. First, it
allowed manipulating actual power (rather than imagined power, as it
is often the case in prior work) without triggering demand effects.
Asking participants to take on a role in which they make decisions that
affect imaginary others could pose generalizability problems because
participants often behave differently when given hypothetical, rather
than actual power (Flynn, Gruenfeld, Molm, & Polzer, 2011; Magee &
Galinsky, 2008; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015; Tost, 2015). In the current
study, we assigned participants to actual leader and follower positions
and gave leaders autonomy to decide how to allocate payouts to
themselves and to their followers, making the exercise of power con-
sequential. Furthermore, demand effects are less problematic in the
current design because the power manipulations were not salient to
participants: we told participants that they would either be a leader or a
follower with no further information about some leaders having more
power than others. Finally, using a more realistic manipulation of
power should, at the very least, increase the ecological validity of our
results (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015).
In spite of the strengths outlined above, our research is not without
limitations. Although our manipulation of leader power reflects how
power exists in organizations (French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1979;
Sherman et al., 2012), the fact that we conducted our study in a con-
trolled laboratory setting among students limits the generalizability of
our findings to actual leadership settings. For instance, it has been ar-
gued that power might not always be salient to powerholders in orga-
nizations, suggesting that the effects of power in the field might be
weaker than in our experiment. It should, however, be noted that field
studies reveal strong and highly significant correlations between one's
actual position of power and one's experienced power (see van Dijke, De
Cremer, Langendijk, & Anderson, 2018), reducing the likelihood that
the effects of power on moral reasoning and self-interested behavior
would disappear in field settings.
Furthermore, some research suggests that power in organizational
settings can produce a sense of responsibility instead of a sense that one
can do what one wants (Tost, 2015). However, prior work that offered
such conclusions either suffers from demand effects (De Wit, Scheepers,
Ellemers, Sassenberg, & Scholl, 2017; Sassenberg, Ellemers, &
Scheepers, 2012; Scholl, Sassenberg, Scheepers, Ellemers, & de Wit,
2017) or used cross-sectional designs (Smith & Hofmann, 2016) that
may be plagued by reverse causality (e.g., feelings of responsibility
leading to higher power) or by omitted variables. In contrast to such
work, our experimental design allows drawing clear causal conclusions
about the relationship between power and moral reasoning and, re-
spectively, power and self-interested behavior. Future work could aim
to identify relevant moderators that qualify the main effects we observe
for leader power. The literature on power provides various candidates
and we address some of them in the following paragraphs.
In the current paper we kept the ratio of leader gains to follower
losses constant across the power conditions so that we could isolate the
effects of power on moral reasoning and self-interested behavior. Future
research could alter this design in various ways. First, in line with re-
search on intergenerational decision-making (Wade-Benzoni, 2002;
Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, & Messick, 2008), adding a tem-
poral separation between the moment when leaders make a choice and
the moment when they as well as others get to enjoy the benefits of that
choice might result in less self-interested behavior. Second, leaders
have the discretion not only to take away from, but also to give to a
common pool. Previous work (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Galinsky et al.,
2003) would suggest that when leaders are presented with the choice of
increasing public welfare (rather than taking away from it), they may
exhibit more prosocial behavior and this is, in part, because leaders
would have to forgo a potential gain rather than give up an already
possessed resource, as it was the case in the current design. Third, a
recent body of work in social psychology argues that the effects of
power depend on how leaders construe the power they have (De Wit
et al., 2017; Sassenberg et al., 2012; Scholl et al., 2017). In particular,
leaders who construe their power as responsibility towards others, ra-
ther than as opportunity for goal attainment, engage in less harmful
behaviors. Future research could examine whether nudging leaders to
take into account others' interest would result in higher moral rea-
soning as well as less self-interested behavior. Lastly, mirroring the
organizational reality, leaders in an organizational context are often
confronted with multiple responsibilities not only towards their sub-
ordinates, but also towards the organization and towards stakeholders.
In the present design, we relaxed such responsibilities. However, as the
work by Overbeck and Park (2001) illustrates, when leaders face con-
flicting responsibilities they tend to favor those towards the organiza-
tion. Future research could examine how multiple conflicting respon-
sibilities shape leaders' moral reasoning as well as their allocation
decisions.
We built our theoretical argument on the idea that self-interest is a
pervasive and unconscious goal for everyone. Because power activates
goal-focused cognitive networks, power should make individuals more
effective at pursuing their self-interest goals. However, the extent to
which individuals engage in self-interested behaviors might vary. This
point is illustrated by prior research that looked at how power interacts
with personality characteristics in predicting self-interested versus
prosocial behavior. Such research has shown that for individuals who
have a natural tendency to be concerned about others (e.g., communal
relationship orientation), power can actually enhance such a tendency
(Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; see also Côté et al., 2011; Schmid Mast,
Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Future research could therefore explore whether
the negative effect of number of followers on moral reasoning is di-
minished or even reversed for powerholders who have a natural ten-
dency to focus on the collective.
A potential limitation inherent in the experimental design used in
the present paper is the manipulation of the leader power component of
power to. In particular, power to was manipulated by increasing the
number of payout options available to the leader from 3 to 4. Research
suggests that having more choices can place cognitive constrains on
decision-making such that more choice might not always result in op-
timal, rational decision-making (Schwartz, 2004). Research also sug-
gests that presenting the more extreme “very antisocial” option next to
the less extreme “antisocial” option might increase the likelihood of
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anchoring one's choice in the latter option because it seems compara-
tively less bad (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). One might therefore argue that leaders with 4
payout options, as opposed to those with 3 payout options, found it
easier to justify picking the “antisocial” option, which would be an
alternative explanation for the effect of number of options on self-in-
terested behavior. However, if this had been the case then we should
have observed that leaders in the 4 options condition picked the anti-
social option more often than those in the 3 payout options condition,
while few picked the very antisocial option. Yet, when inspecting the
frequency of choices leaders made across conditions (see Table 3), we
see that when moving from 3 to 4 payout options, leaders tended to
pick the prosocial or default option less often and opted for the very
antisocial option rather than primarily opting for the antisocial option.
Irrespective of this observation, future research could aim to avoid
choice overload or potential anchoring effects by replacing the anti-
social option with the very antisocial option for the power to condition
with 3 payout options. This would ensure that there is only one selfish
option presented across both power to conditions. Alternatively, scho-
lars could opt for a mixed design with number of followers as a be-
tween-person factor and number of payout options as a within-person
factor and examine whether the same leader tends to anchor their
choice onto the antisocial option as the number of payout options in-
creases.
Another potential limitation of the present experimental design is
the variation in the size of the group sessions, which could have com-
promised anonymity. We ensured that leaders' allocation decisions re-
garding the payouts were anonymous in three ways. First, followers
were not informed about the structure of the payout options, but merely
about the range of payment. Second, followers learned about the lea-
der's allocation decision only when the data collection was finished and
they received their earning in their bank account. Third, followers did
not know how many leaders were in the room, making it impossible for
them to attribute their earnings to one specific leader. Nevertheless, we
found a weak correlation between one of the leader power manipula-
tions – number of followers – and the size of the laboratory group
sessions (r=0.26, p= .06, n=51), suggesting that our findings for
number of followers might be confounded with session size. However,
the other leader power manipulation – number of payout options – was
not correlated with session size (r=0.13, p= .34, n=51). One way in
which number of followers might be confounded with session size is
that in larger sessions leaders potentially felt more anonymous and
therefore more inclined to act in self-interested ways. However, it is
hard to see how such decreased anonymity could affect leaders' prin-
cipled moral reasoning (which is by definition anonymous), but would
have no effect on actual self-interested behavior.
Whereas Bendahan et al. (2015) found an effect of number of fol-
lowers on self-interested behavior, we did not. One potential explana-
tion for the null effect observed in our study lies in our experimental
procedure whereby leaders and followers were brought to the lab in
smaller groups than in a large classroom setting as Bendahan and col-
leagues did in Study 1. Smaller groups might have triggered different
construals of the situation. In particular, it is possible that the presence
of fewer others made the leader's lack of power more salient. Past work
suggests that others' level of power can influence the choices leaders
make by triggering either strategic or social responsibility considera-
tions when making allocation decisions. For instance, it has been shown
that negotiation opponents who are completely powerless often end up
with better negotiation outcomes, compared to opponents who have a
bit of power (Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). When an opponent is
confronted with a weak recipient, the allocator will assess the decision
as strategic and competitive (Suleiman, 1996) and would also be more
likely to act in an aggressive way towards the recipient (Baumeister,
Smart, & Boden, 1996; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). However,
when the recipient is completely powerless and therefore cannot re-
taliate in any way, prosocial rather than self-serving considerations
become more prominent in the opponent's allocation decision
(Handgraaf et al., 2008). Future research could address such issues by
varying the degree of power that followers have (cf. Handgraaf et al.,
2008) and examine how this shapes leaders' moral reasoning and their
allocation decisions.
Finally, we wish to address the distinct effects of power over and
power to. We found a main negative effect of power over others, but not
of power to enforce one's will, on moral reasoning. We further found a
main positive effect of power to enforce one's will, but not of power
over others, on self-interested behavior. These distinct effects are in-
triguing and suggest that the two components of leader power might
trigger a focus on the goal of self-interest via different routes, namely by
differentially shaping individuals' construal level. According to con-
strual level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010; see also Wiesenfeld,
Reyt, Brockner, & Trope, 2017), mental representations can be concrete
and situationally-bound (low construal level) or abstract and decon-
textualized (high construal level). Our results suggest that power to
enforce one's will over others may have activated concrete, thus si-
tuationally-bound, action-oriented cognitive networks, which enabled
leaders to engage in self-interested behavior. In contrast, power over
others may have activated abstract, and thus not situationally-bound,
cognitive networks, which affected leaders' moral reasoning. Indeed,
theoretical (Fiske, 1993) and empirical (Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 2006;
Overbeck & Park, 2001, Study 3) work on power suggests that having
power over more followers triggers abstract cognitive shortcuts, such as
stereotypes. Overall, the type of construal that power activates might
depend on the operationalization of power: power to enforce one's will
triggers low level construal, whereas power over others triggers high
level construal. Our suggestion is in contrast with prior construal level
work on power that argues that power triggers abstract and decontex-
tualized thinking (cf. Smith & Trope, 2006; Stel, van Dijk, Smith, van
Dijk, & Djalal, 2012). In line with our results and with recent re-
commendations (cf. Wiesenfeld et al., 2017), future research addressing
the relationship between power and construal level might benefit from
exploring how different components of leader power relate to construal
level.
Conclusion
Moral issues are the most prevalent and among the most difficult
challenges that organizational leaders have to deal with (Zhang, Gino,
& Margolis, 2018). Part of the difficulty lies in that solving moral issues
often involves a tradeoff between conflicting, yet valued principles (cf.
Graham et al., 2009). Yet, another part of the difficulty lies in that
power may influence how leaders think about moral issues and, sub-
sequently, how they behave. In the present paper we found suggestive
evidence that power triggers self-interested behavior because it influ-
ences their moral reasoning. However, we did find clear evidence that
the two dimensions of leader power – number of followers and number
of payout options – have distinct effects on moral reasoning and, re-
spectively, on self-interested behavior. Whereas, it might be tempting to
say that Andy Fastow behaved unethically because power corrupts, our
results suggests that the effects of power on corruption are less
straightforward than previously thought. To conclude, power is a
complex phenomenon and should be studied as such if we are to unveil
its true colors.
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Appendix A
For clarity and symmetry with the graphic representation of our
models (see Fig. 1), we present the statistical equations without any
control variables. We note, however, that we estimated models that
include compensation and its interaction terms with both power con-
ditions as control variables in the main analyses. In Models 1 through 3,
we allowed the error terms of moral reasoning and self-interested be-
havior to covary. In Model 4, we fixed the covariance of the error terms
of moral reasoning and self-interested behavior to 0.
A.1. Model 1
Moral Reasoning= β0+ β1Number of followers+ β2Number of payout
options+ e
Self-interested behavior=γ0+ γ1Number of followers+γ2Number of
payout options+ u
A.2. Model 2
Moral Reasoning= β0+ β1Number of followers+ β2Number of payout
options+ e
Self-interested behavior=γ0+ γ1Moral reasoning+ u
A.3. Model 3
Moral Reasoning= β0+ β1Number of followers+ β2Number of payout
options+ e
Self-interested behavior=γ0+ γ1Moral reasoning+γ2Number of
payout options+ u
A.4. Model 4
Moral Reasoning= β0+ β1Number of followers+ β2Number of payout
options+ e
Self-interested behavior=γ0+ γ1Moral reasoning+γ2Number of
payout options+ u
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